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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION:
THE LEGALITY OF MINORITY HIRING GOALS
Equal opportunity in employment is of paramount importance in
achieving racial equality.' Since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act it
has become apparent that it is often necessary to impose minority hiring
goals2 to alleviate racial imbalances. 3 Such goals are, however, a form of
reverse discrimination, since they deliberately favor minority groups on
the basis of race. 4 Thus courts must reconcile the remedial necessity for
minority hiring goals with the discriminatory effect such goals may have
on individual white workers. 5 A recent Second Circuit decision6 pro-
I. See Rachlin, Title VII: Limitations and Qualifications, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV.
473,494 (1966); Sape &Hart, Title VIIReconsidered: The EqualEmployment Opportunity
Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 889 (1972).
2. Court-ordered minority hiring goals require that a union or employer make a good
faith effort to achieve a reasonable goal in minority recruitment. Bracy, The Questionable
Legality of Affirmative Action: A Response, 51 J. URBAN L. 421, 425 (1974).
3. See Rachlin, supra note 1, at 491; Note, Minority Workers and the Continuing
Effect of Racial Discrimination-the Limits of Remedial Treatment, 58 IowA L. REV. 143,
164 (1972); Note, Constitutionality of Remedial Minority Preferences in Employment, 56
MINN. L. REv. 842, 844-45 (1972).
The term "racial imbalance" has been equated with "discrimination" under Title VII.
42 TENN. L. REV. 397,401-02 (1975). Establishing a racially disproportionate impact is not,
however, sufficient for a prima facie case of discrimination under the fourteenth amend-
ment. Plaintiffs must show a racially discriminatory purpose. Washington v. Davis, 96 S.
Ct. 2040, 2047 (1976) (employment test of the Washington, D.C., police department
challenged under due process clause). For a discussion of statistical methods of analyzing
employment discrimination beyond simply establishing a disparity between the number of
minorities in the union and the minority population of the community see Note, Beyond the
Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89
HARV. L. REV. 387 (1975). See also Sape, The Use of Numerical Goals to Achieve
Integration in Employment, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 481, 490-93 (1975).
4. Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 427 (2d
Cir. 1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333,
1340 (2d Cir. 1973).
5. See Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 429 (2d
Cir. 1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333,
1341 (2d Cir. 1973). Compare Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1116 (1971) (it is unjust to
impose the cost of remedying society's discrimination on poor whites who may not have
been part of the discrimination and who are least able to bear the burden), with Kaplan,
Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
vides substantial support for the legality of minority hiring goals and
indicates that courts will attempt to balance these competing interests.
In Patterson v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union,7 a non-union
minority8 worker sued the Union, alleging racial discrimination9 and
charging that the structure and administration of the collective bargain-
ing agreement 0 violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."
Larkin, a non-union white worker, intervened to protect his potential
interest in the relief sought.' 2 The district court approved a settlement
agreement between Patterson and the Union which established a minor-
ity hiring goal of 25% and specified a procedure to attain that goal. 3
Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363, 364 (1966) (it is also unfair to leave the burden of
remedying society's discrimination on minority workers who are the victims of that
discrimination).
6. Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975).
7. Id. Patterson filed a class action on behalf of minority persons against the News-
paper and Mail Deliverers' Union, The New York Times, The New York Daily News, The
New York Post, and fifty other news distributors and publishers in the New York City
metropolitan area. Patterson's action was consolidated with an action brought by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against the same defendants. Id. at 769.
8. The Patterson court defined "minority" to include persons who are Black,
Spanish-surnamed, Oriental and American Indian. Id. at 769 n. 1.
9. Union membership was traditionally limited to the first-born son of a union
member. At the time of Patterson's suit, 99% of the 4200 union members were white. Id. at
769-70.
10. The collective bargaining agreement, adopted by the Union and newspaper pub-
lishers in 1952, divided the industry's work force into those who held regular positions and
those who arrived each day to do any extra work ("shapers"). The order in which shapers
were chosen for extra work on each shift was determined by their group membership and
their seniority within the group. Group I, the highest priority group, consisted of persons
who once held a regular position in the industry and had been laid off or voluntarily
transferred from one employer to another. Each employer had a separate Group I list.
Group II consisted of all regular position holders and Group I members throughout the
industry, enabling them to obtain extra daily work with employers other than their own.
Group III consisted of those persons who had not held a regular position in the industry but
who reported for daily work on a regular basis. Although the Union represented all
delivery workers, membership was limited to regular position holders and Group I
members. Id.
Regular vacancies were filled from the Group I list. When the Group I list was
exhausted, vacancies were filled from the Group III list. Group I lists, however, were
artificially inflated by voluntary transfers from one employer to another, fictitious lay-
offs and false assertion of Group I membership by family and friends of union members.
No Group III workers had advanced to regular positions since 1963, thus preserving the
Union's all-white membership. Id.
II. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1970).
12. Larkin represented approximately 100 white, non-union, Group III workers. 514
F.2d at 769.
13. Id. at 770-71. The settlement agreement provided that the union be permanently




Larkin appealed, arguing that the relief granted to minority workers
resulted in relatively fewer employment opportunities for non-union
white workers and was thus discriminatory.14 The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit upheld the affirmative hiring plan, finding it fair to
both minority and white workers.
15
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination 16 and grants broad
remedial power to the federal courts.17 The courts have developed a
variety of remedies under Title VII 8 to alleviate job discrimination. As a
appointed to ensure compliance with the agreement, and a minority hiring goal of 25% be
established. The 25% goal was to be reached within five years by moving all incumbent
minority persons in Group III to Group I, hiring new Group III workers in a ratio of three
minorities to two whites, filling Group I vacancies on an alternating one-to-one basis
between minority and white workers, and eliminating all voluntary transfers until the goal
was achieved. Id.
14. Larkin argued that since Group III white workers had also suffered from the union
policies, they should receive the same relief as minorities; that the relief granted to
minorities was at the expense of the Group III white workers; and that the 25% goal was
too high. Id. at 771.
15. Id. at 775. Judge Feinberg concurred but added a strong note of caution. He
asserted that minority hiring quotas should be approached somewhat gingerly: "A racial
quota is inherently obnoxious, no matter what the beneficent purpose. Such a quota is
demeaning and divisive. At best it is a lesser evil. It is not to be encouraged." Id. at 776.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-15
(Supp. IV, 1974).
17. Id. § 2000e-5(g), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. IV, 1974):
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may
. . . order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is
not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay. . . or
any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1974); United States v. IBEW
Local 212, 472 F.2d 634, 636 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 464 F.2d
301, 309 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973); United States v. Ironworkers
Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 553 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Parham v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421,428 (8th Cir. 1970); Hutchings v. United States
Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 310 (5th Cir. 1970); Local 53, Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler,
407 F.2d 1047, 1052-53 (5th Cir. 1969); Sape, supra note 3, at 496; 60 IowA L. REV. 693
(1975); 42 TENN. L. REV. 397.
18. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 1251 (1976) (retroactive
seniority); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (backpay); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (prohibition of the use of non-job-related discriminatory
tests); Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1975) (modification of
promotion); Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974) (modifica-
tion of transfer practices); Cornist v. Rickland Parish School Bd., 495 F.2d 189 (5th Cir.
1974) (reinstatement); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir.
1974) (modification of apprenticeship program); United States v. IBEW Local 212, 472
F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973) (modification of union referral system); United States v. Sheet-
metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969) (employer must publicize its
nondiscriminatory hiring practices). See generally United States v. Ironworkers Local 86,
443 F.2d 544,553 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Parham v. Southwestern Bell
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last resort, courts have imposed minority hiring goals.' 9 This type of
relief has generated substantial controversy, however, since such goals
deliberately favor the hiring of minority persons on the basis of race. 20
The Supreme Court has recognized the breadth of the courts' remedial
power under Title VII21 but has yet to specifically approve minority
hiring goals.
22
The minority hiring goal established in Patterson is the latest develop-
ment in the Second Circuit's gradual acceptance of hiring goals. Ini-
tially, the Second Circuit reluctantly approved hiring goals to correct
Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421,428(8th Cir. 1970); Sape, supra note3 at497;60 IOWA L. REV. 693,
698; 42 TENN. L. REV. 397, 398.
19. See Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 629-31 (2d Cir.
1974) and cases cited therein.
20. Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 427 (2d
Cir. 1975).
21. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1251, 1267 (1976), and
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975), quoting Louisiana v. United
States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965) (voting rights): A court has "not merely the power but the
duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of
past as well as bar like discrimination in the future."
22. The Supreme Court has avoided the specific issue of minority percentage goals.
McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2574, 2578 n.8 (1976). See DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). The Court has, however, recognized the appropriateness
of mathematical ratios in school desegregation, Swann v. Charlott-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1970), and has affirmed the use of ratios in faculty desegregation.
United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969). Mathematical
ratios might easily be extended from faculty desegregation to employment. See Employ-
ment Discrimination: A Title VIISymposium, 34 LA. L. REV. 540,555 (1974). The Court
has also approved preferential treatment in the employment of Indians, but in doing so
noted that the classification was based on "federally recognized tribes" not race and that
the preferential treatment was within the unique Congressional obligation to Indians under
article I, § 8 and article II, § 2 of the United States Constitution. Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
The Court has approved affirmative relief short of imposed quotas. It has approved
backpay awards and modification of seniority systems. See Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 96 S. Ct. 1251 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). But the
Court has also acknowledged the problem of reverse discrimination. McDonald v. Sante
Fe Trail Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2574, 2577 (1976) ("Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits the discharge of 'any individual' because of 'such individual's race' . . . . Its
terms are not limited to discrimination against members of any particular race"). The
Court has interpreted the Civil Rights Act to require employment on the basis of qualifica-
tion not race: "In short, the Act does not command that any person be hired simply
because he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a
minority group. Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is pre-
cisely and only what Congress has proscribed." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
430-31 (1974). See generally Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Discrimination, 41 U.





discriminatory practices in public employment. 23 The court sanctioned
the use of hiring goals in the public sector because there was no other
method of affording relief without disrupting essential public services, 24
but refused to extend such affirmative relief to promotions.
25
The Second Circuit extended its approval of hiring goals to private
employment26 in Rios v. Enterprise Association Steamfitters Local
638.27 In Rios the district court found that the defendant union had
23, In Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333,
1339 (2d Cir. 1973), the court order established a "minority pool" and required that 50% of
the current 10 vacancies, 75% of the next 20 vacancies, and 50% of all vacancies occurring
thereafter be filled from the minority pool until the police force was composed of 15%
minority persons. Additionally, in Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387,
398-99, (2d Cir. 1973), the court affirmed a district court order requiring that minority
firemen be hired in a ratio of one minority to three whites. Accord, Western Addition
Community Organization v. Alioto, 514 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1975) (the court ordered the
Civil Service Commission to hire firemen in a ratio of one minority to one white applicant
until a list of qualified minority applicants was exhausted); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614
(5th Cir. 1974) (court-ordered affirmative hiring plan to achieve 25% minority employment
in the Alabama State Troopers); Erie Human Relations Comm'n v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d
Cir. 1974) (court ordered that 50% of the 20 vacancies on the police force be filled with
minority persons); Pennsylvania v. O'Neil, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973) (court affirmed a
district court order enjoining the hiring of Philadelphia policemen except in a ratio of at
least one minority person to two whites); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (court ordered that one out of every three persons hired
by Minneapolis Fire Department be a minority person until 20 minority persons were
hired).
24. Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387,398 (2d Cir. 1973). SeeKirkland
v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 427 (2d Cir. 1975); Rios v.
Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 638 (2d Cir. 1974) (dissenting
opinion); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333,
1340 (2d Cir. 1973).
25. Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d
Cir. 1973). Promotion to sergeant, lieutenant and captain required three years time-in-
grade for each promotion. Such requirements would delay the achievement of a racial
balance in positions above patrolman, but the court asserted that imposinggoals above the
patrolman level would "obviously discriminate against those whites who have embarked
upon a police career with the expectation of advancement only to be now thwarted
because of their color alone." Id. at 1341. The court suggested that the time-in-grade
requirements might be shortened and that seniority might be given less weight in
promotion decisions as alternative means of alleviating the racial imbalance above the
patrolman level. On remand these suggestions were adopted and affirmed. 497 F.2d 1115
(2d Cir. 1974). In Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420,
429 (2d Cir. 1975), the court, quoting Bridgeport, reversed a district court order imposing a
goal of one minority for every three whites promoted to sergeant.
26. See United States v. Wood, Wire& Metal Lathers, Local 46,471 F.2d408 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 412 U.S.939 (1973), in which an administrator ordered an affirmative hiring
plan in an out-of-court settlement. The court held that § 7030) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (see note 31 infra) did not apply because the union had waived the benefits of § 703(j)
by accepting the out-of-court settlement.
27. 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974), noted in 60 IowA L. REv. 693, and 42 TENN. L. REv.
397.
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discriminated against minority persons and ordered an affirmative
action plan to achieve a 30% minority membership. 28 On appeal by the
Union,29 the Second Circuit remanded for a recalculation of the percen-
tage goal3" but held that the district court order did not violate section
703(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' which provides that the Act does
not require a union to grant preferential treatment to anyone because of
his race. 32
The Patterson court summarily rejected the section 703(j) cliallenge in
a footnote.33 Section 7036) had been a significant obstacle to the use of
hiring goals.34 If interpreted literally, section 703(j) would virtually
nullify Title VII. 35 The Civil Rights Act, on the other hand, is a clear
mandate to remedy racial discrimination. 36 The courts and commen-
tators have resolved this apparent conflict by narrowly construing
section 703(j) to allow the imposition of hiring goals.37 The Second
28. 501 F.2d 622.
29. The Union argued that the minority goal ordered by the district court violated the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment and § 703(j) (see
note 31 infra) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 628.
30. Id. at 633. The Rios court established guidelines for determining specific percen-
tage goals. It held that hiring goals must reflect the percentage of minority persons in the
labor force in the relevant geographic area as found in U.S. census reports, rather than the
percentage of minority persons in the general population. Id.
31. 501 F.2d 622. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970) provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer,
employment agency, labor organization or joint labor-management committee. . . to
grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an
imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons
of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer. . . in
comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. . . in the available work force ...
32. Judge Hays strongly disagreed with the majority's interpretation of § 7030). 501
F.2d at 634-39 (Hays, J., dissenting). He relied heavily on the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to support his interpretation of § 703(j) as prohibiting all preferential
treatment. Id. at 634-37. See Blumrosen, Quotas, Common Sense, and Law in Labor
Relations: Three Dimensions of Equal Opportunity, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 675, 691-92
(1974); Sape, supra note 3, at 497-98. 'But as one commentator has noted, Judge Hays, in
reviewing the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act, failed to note that in 1972 Congress
rejected two amendments to § 703() that would have explicitly prohibited racial quotas. 60
IOWA L. REv. 693, 700-02.
33. 514 F.2d at 772 n.3.
34. Note, Constitutionality of Remedial Minority Preference, supra note 3, at 857-64.
35. United States v. IBEW Local 38,428 F.2d 144, 149-50(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 943 (1970).
36. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970).
37. See Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315,325-26 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
950 (1972) (distinguishing "quotas" from "goals"); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of




Circuit has held that section 703(j) bars the remedial use of minority
hiring goals only when a racial imbalance is the result of a legitimate
business necessity. 38 Thus section 703(j) does not apply when the racial
imbalance is due to employment discrimination. Other circuits have
agreed with this interpretation. 39 The Patterson court decided the issue
was settled. 40
Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968) (goals are permitted but not required);
Blumrosen, supra note 32, at 692 (only national goals are prohibited); Bracy, supranote2,
at 425; Cooper & Sobal, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General
Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1675
(1969) (f 703(j) merely precludes any per se rule).
38. Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 630 (2d Cir. 1974)
(§ 703(j) is limited to racial imbalance attributable to causes other than discrimination);
United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers, Local 46, 472 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); see 60 IOWA L. REV. 693, 703-06; 42 TENN. L. REV. 397,
401-04.
Section 703(j) is further limited by the narrowness of the business necessity test. See,
e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("The Act proscribes not only
overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the
practice is prohibited."); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d
Cir. 1971) ("If the legitimate ends of safety and efficiency can be served by a reasonably
available alternative system with less discriminatory effects, then the present policies may
not be continued."). See generally Symposium, supra note 22, at 577-80; Comment, Title
VII: Discriminatory Results and the Scope of Business Necessity, 35 LA. L. REV. 146
(1974); Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No
Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974); 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 1285, 1287 (1975); 42
TENN. L. REV. 397, 402-04.
The Rios court also distinguished between "quotas" and "goals." Quotas are mandat-
ory minimum standards that must be met and permanently maintained. Goals merely
required that an employer make a good faith effort to reach the suggested standard. Goals
are enforced only until they are achieved. The court interpreted § 703(j) to ban permanent
quotas but not temporary goals. In Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional
Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1975), the Second Circuit affirmed in part a district
court order imposing an interim hiring goal pending the development of a new selection
procedure but reversed that part of the order imposing a permanent hiring quota of one
minority to every three whites. See also 60 IowA L. REV. 693, 707-08.
39. See, e.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354(8th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972);
United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 553-54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 984 (1971); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245,250 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1970); United States v. IBEW Local 38,428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 923 (1970). But cf. Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971) (§ 7030) held not to be alimitation on executive
orders, implying that it was a limitation on relief granted under Title VII). See generally
Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 629-31, 637-39 (2d Cir.
1974); 60 IOWA L. REV. 693, 703-06.
40. 514 F.2d at 772 n.3. But cf. Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional
Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 429 (2d Cir. 1975) in which the court questioned the legality of
minority hiring goals on constitutional grounds.
1976]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
Having concluded that section 703(0) does not prohibit hiring goals,
the Patterson court limited its review of the affirmative hiring plan to
determining whether the settlement agreement was fair to both minority
and white workers. 41 Affirmative action plans that involved bumping
incumbent white workers 42 or establishing goals in promotion 43 had been
previously considered unfair. The Patterson court found no bumping or
promotional goals.44 The court emphasized that this settlement agree-
ment benefited both minority and white workers; the benefit to the
minority workers would be more immediate but was not so unfair as to
require rejection of the plan.45
The ease with which the court approved a percentage goal in Patter-
sor4 6 indicates that such goals are now an accepted remedy for discrimi-
nation established under Title VII.47 Affirmative hiring plans may be a
41. 514 F.2d at 773. The court's review was limited to some extent by the posture of the
case. In reviewing a settlement agreement, the court is usually limited to deciding whether
the trial judge was guilty of an abuse of discretion. Id. at771. See Patterson v. Newspaper
& Mail Deliverers' Union, 384 F. Supp. 585, 587-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
The court did review Larkin's other two objections to the settlement agreement. Larkin
argued that all Group III members had been denied access to union vacancies by the
structure and administration of the collective bargaining agreement, see note 10 supra, and
thus all white workers were entitled to the same relief as minority workers. The court held
that Larkin was not entitled to the same relief as the minority plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(l) (1970) because the discrimination which Larkin alleged was not based on
race as prohibited by the statute but on his membership in the Group III work force. 514
F.2d at 772. Larkin also argued that the 25% goal was too high, but the court held that goal
was appropriate because the district court had closely followed the guidelines set down in
Rios. Id. See note 30 supra.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652,659 (2d Cir. 1971)
(bumping occurs when a minority worker is moved into a position held by a white worker
as opposed to being hired to fill a vacancy); cf. Local 189, United Papermakers v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980, 988 (5th Cir. 1969).
43. See, e.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d
1333 (2d Cir. 1973); accord, Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
But cf. Pennsylvania v. O'Neil, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973) (quota for supervisory
positions was rejected but only because the promotion test was not proven to be dis-
criminatory); Allen v. City of Mobile, 466 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
909 (1973). See generally Symposium, supra note 22, at 560-62.
44. 514 F.2d at 774. The court implied, however, that bumping and promotional goals
might not be unfair in some circumstances. Id. at 775. But see Kirkland v. New York State
Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975).
45. 514 F.2d at 774.
46. Patterson may not have been appropriate for a reconsideration of the legality of
minority hiring goals under § 703(j) or the fourteenth amendment, since the settlement
agreement did benefit both minority and white workers. 514 F.2d at 776 (Hays, J.,
concurring).
47. The overwhelming precedent for the legality of minority hiring goals may be




necessary and legitimate means of alleviating the effects of past dis-
crimination. The white intervenors in Patterson, however, argued that
an affirmative hiring plan which was at the expenseof white workers was
not a legitimate means of alleviating the effects of past discrimination. 48
The Second Circuit decided that question sub silentio by finding that the
burden on white workers was not sufficient to make the hiring plan
unfair. 49 The court's approach in Patterson indicates that it will balance
the need for imposing affirmative hiring plans against the burden such
plans place on individual white workers, 50 but leaves open the crucial
Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1059 (5th Cir. 1974) (Clark, J., concurring), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
895 (1975).
48. It has been argued that minority preference is a legitimate remedy for racial
imbalance as long as white applicants are not refused jobs simply because of their race.
See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 854 (1971) in which the Department of Labor argued that contractors in the Philadel-
phia area could meet specific hiring goals without adversely affecting the existing labor
force. "Some minority tradesmen could be recruited, in other words, without eliminating
job opportunities for white tradesmen." Id. at 173. See also Rachlin, supra note 1, at
491-92; Note, Constitutionality of Remedial Minority Preferences, supra, note 3, at 850.
This rationale is less persuasive when high unemployment necessitates the denial of
positions to white applicants. Cf. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 336 n.18 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas distinguished Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1970) (school desegregation), noting that the mathematical ratio
approved in Swann would not exclude any white person from the public school system
while the preferential admissions program attacked in DeFunis would exclude some
qualified white applicants since positions in law school were scarce.
49. The affirmative hiring plan in Patterson affected the Group III white workers in
three ways. The immediate transfer of incumbent minority workers to Group I and the
filling of Group I vacancies by alternately promoting minority and white workers would:
(1) advance white workers less rapidly than they would have advanced under the normal
seniority system; (2) drop Group III white workers in daily work priority by whatever
number of minority workers with less seniority were promoted; and (3) retard the Group
Ill white worker's progress up the daily work priority ladder. These burdens were off-set
by the fact that all Group III workers, white and minority, would eventually be promoted
to Group I, an opportunity available to none of them prior to the agreement. 514 F.2d at
773.
It has been argued that any burden a majority places upon itself is acceptable if
reasonably related to a legitimate state purpose. Alleviating the effects of past racial
discrimination is a legitimate purpose and affirmative hiring plans are a reasonable means
of achieving that purpose. The burdens that must be most strictly scrutinized are those that
the majority places on a powerless minority. See Ely, supra note 22.
50. See Comment, The Myth of Reverse Racial Discrimination: An Historical Pros-
pective, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 319, 323-24 (1974). In Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co., 96 S. Ct. 1251 (1976), the Supreme Court vacated a district court order denying
retroactive competitive seniority to minority persons discriminated against by Bowman's
hiring practices. Bowman argued that retroactive seniority would conflict with the inter-
ests of non-minority employees. Id. at 1268. The Court responded that the conflicting
interests of non-minority employees will always be affected when scarce employment
benefits are distributed according to seniority and that to deny retroactive seniority
because of the effect it might have on innocent employees would frustrate the "make
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issue of the extent of affirmative relief a court may require without
tipping that delicate balance.5
James A. Martell
whole" objective of Title VII. Id. at 1268-71. Mr. Justice Powell disagreed, arguing that
the need to grant retroactive competitive seniority must be balanced against the rights and
expectations of the innocent non-minority employees. Awarding monetary damages or
backpay penalizes the employer, but retroactive competitive seniority is at the expense of
innocent third parties. Id. at 1274-78 (Powell, J., concurring). 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g) (Supp.
IV, 1974) (see note 17 supra) mandates that a district court determine the "appropriate"
relief through its "equitable powers," which necessarily includes the power to "balance
equities." 96 S. Ct. at 1278-80. Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger agreed with
Justice Powell's analysis of the court's equitable powers. Thus it appears that the Court
does not favor a balancing approach to hiringgoals. In McDonald v. Sante FeTransp. Co.,
96 S. Ct. 2574, 2578 n.8 (1976) the Court specifically rejected an argument that discrimina-
tion against white persons is tolerable if not unduly burdensome.
51. The court must weigh the burden on white workers on a case-by-case basis. It is
clear that a union or employer can be required to fill new vacancies with minority persons
without placing an unreasonable burden on white workers. See Contractors Ass'n v.
Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 173 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). It is also
clear that bumping white workers from their positions to alleviate racial imbalance is an
unreasonable burden. See Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520
F.2d 420,429 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652,659 (2d
Cir. 1971). The Patterson court found that a temporary burden on white workers was not
unreasonable. 514 F.2d at 773. The court's extensive discussion of the fairness of the
settlement agreement in Patterson, however, indicates that a temporary burden on white
workers approaches the unreasonable burden that may invalidate an affirmative hiring
plan. Id. at 773-75.
This balancing approach may not be sufficient to alleviate the effects of past discrimina-
tion. Courts should be careful when applying such a test to guard against balancing the
mere preferences of white workers against the civil rights of minority workers.
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